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The region as a whole is lagging behind the recovery of others in the world. The future shows 
a shift in global economic power, away from the established advanced economies, especially 
from those in Europe, towards emerging ones in Asia and elsewhere. Compared to earlier 
years, risks related to euro area economic conditions have increased. This influences the 
function and effectiveness of the banking sector as well. The global outlook has deteriorated. 
The top three prominent risks expected to affect the euro area banking system over the next 
years are: (1) economic, political, and debt sustainability challenges in the euro area, (2) 
business model sustainability, and (3) cybercrime and IT deficiencies. The study discusses 
these factors with special emphasis on banking supervision. It analyses EU bank regulation 
after the financial crisis and its prospects. 
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1. Introduction 
We see rapid changes in technology and big uncertainties in global trade and 
finance (Gál 2015). It has been said many times: “Europe is at a crossroads”. But, 
maybe, “this time really is different...” There are new challenges before Europe 
both in environmental policies, digitalization, and defence. Finance plays a role in 
these changes. 
A detailed analysis shows that the world economy really has arrived in a fully 
new era. We live in the age of digitalization, robotics, big data, and artificial 
intelligence. Since 2008 nothing is like it was before. The financial system had to 
change, too. The globalization of the former decades when world exports were 
growing quicker than world GDP, has ended. In theory, GDP grows alongside the 
credit/asset (financial deepening) – but asset backing cannot be higher than 100%. 
How then to give impetus to growth by financial deepening? Some economists think 
that we should not force growth, but rather stop it. If growth after all that arises, it will 
happen by robots. That means, we should tax the owners of robots and owners of data, 
and transfer it as basic income to those persons who fall out of the world of work… 
New ideas, new institutional solutions. 
As the global economy evolves, how can Europe best position itself?  
Christine Lagarde, the former IMF head, subsequently became the President 
of the ECB. She has a world-wide overview of global competitivness and of the 
factors influencing growth. Her field is monetary policy and banking system stability. 
There are intensive efforts in the EU to complete the banking union and to build a 
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capital markets union. Will it be enough? Surely, competitiveness doesn’t depend only 
in financial backing. But it is important, we may be convinced. 
In some of her speeches, Lagarde tried to position the EU on a world scale. 
We do the same in the following. 
2. Economic prospects  
In the last decade, we can see a realignment of the world economic centres. It is to 
be found in the shift in global economic power away from established advanced 
economies, especially those in Europe, towards emerging economies in Asia and 
elsewhere. According to PwC analysis (PwC 2017), by 2050, six of the seven largest 
economies (in PPP terms) in the world could come from today’s emerging 
economies (E7). 
The E7 countries could comprise almost 50% of world GDP by 2050, while 
the G7’s share declines to only just over 20%. Well, absolute figures of GDP depend 
on the population of the country, and the emerging market economies include the 
world’s most populous countries. They clearly show the realignment, partly due to 
their large and growing populations, partly because of their high rate of per capita 
GDP-growth. 
In 2018, China already overtook the US and is to become the world’s larges 
economy (in terms of purchasing power parity –PPP). India currently stands in third 
place. But, in the projections, India is set to overtake the US in PPP by 2040. By 2050, 
France will no longer be among the world’s ten largest economies on this basis. The 
UK will be on 10th place, while Indonesia could rise to 4th place by 2050.  
Growth will be in the world economy driven largely by emerging markets and 
developing countries. The E7 economies, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, 
Russia, and Turkey will be growing at an annual average rate of almost 3.5% over the 
next 34 years. The advanced G7 nations of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
the UK, and the US will have a growth rate of only 1.6%. (PwC 2017) 
Naturally, it doesn’t mean that G7 countries will change places with these 
champion nations concerning GDP per capita. What is important for the citizens of 
countries, is really the per capita GDP. But even then, we may not say that absolute 
terms are irrelevant. Sooner or later, the E7 will influence the growth possibilities 
of the more advanced nations and indirectly, the working places and the living 
standard there.  
Nowadays, the small oil-rich countries are on top of the list in high GDP/capita. 
The USA is ranked only at 11–12. (We looked at different data collections: IMF, WB, 
CIA.) Among the top contenders are Luxembourg and Switzerland. In the first 10, are 
the Norwegians. Surprisingly the Irish are 5–7th. Germany’s ranking is only 17–19, 
Japan’s: 25–28. Hungary is: 45–46th. 
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2.1. World trade and the EU 
The division of labour usually results in higher GDP. Therefore the trade activity of 
the different nations (regions) is very important.  
In the early 1980s, Europe’s share in world trade was overwhelming. By 2019 
it had been shrinking significantly. But even today, it has a leading role.  
The EU-28’s share of world trade in 2018 in goods was the largest in terms 
of exports. China had almost exactly the same share (16.2 %). The EU was the second-
largest in terms of imports, behind the United States (18.3 %). The United States had 
the third-largest share of world exports of goods and China the third-largest share of 
imports, with Japan recording the fourth largest shares for both exports and imports. 
Canada and South Korea had the fifth and sixth largest shares of exports and import 
of goods, with Canada having more imports and South Korea more exports, while 
Mexico had the seventh largest share. 
Turning to services, regardless of whether analyzing exports or imports, the 
United States had the second-largest share of the world’s trade in services, followed 
by China and Japan. South Korea, Canada, and India had the next largest shares of 
imports, whereas India had a higher share of exports than South Korea or Canada. The 
EU-28’s contribution to world trade was even greater, totaling 24.7 % of exports and 
21.1 % of imports. In the field of services, the EU is a net exporter. The EU-28’s extra-
EU trade in services was clearly larger than any of the other G20 members, both in 
terms of exports and imports (EC 2018). 
2.2. Trends in demography 
The populations of 55 countries or areas are projected to decrease by one percent or 
more between 2019 and 2050 because of sustained low levels of fertility, and, in some 
places, high rates of emigration. 
More than half of the projected increase in the global population up to 2050 
will be concentrated in just nine countries: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, the United Republic of Tanzania, Indonesia, 
and as one exception, in a developed country: the United States of America. Disparate 
population growth rates among the world’s largest countries will re-order their 
ranking by size: for example, India is projected to surpass China as the world’s most 
populous country by around 2027. 
A total of 21 countries are projected to experience a population decrease of 
between 10 and 20 percent between 2019 and 2050, many of which are located in 
Eastern Europe (and the Caribbean). The largest relative reductions in population size 
over that period, with losses of around 20 percent or more, are expected in Bulgaria, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, (and the Wallis and Futuna Islands). The number of deaths 
has been exceeding the number of births in: Belarus, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, 
Italy, Japan, the Russian Federation, Serbia, and the Ukraine. In some of those 
countries, immigration compensated for the diminishing number of births, namely in 
Germany, Italy, and Russia.  
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With regard to emigration: net inflow in 14 countries exceeded 1 million 
people over the past decade. All 14 were among the high-income or upper-middle-
income countries. 
Ten countries experienced a net outflow of more than 1 million migrants 
between 2010 and 2020. For many of these, losses of population due to migration 
mainly involve temporary labour movements. Some of them – from Syria, Venezuela 
– were real refugees. (According to the international institution's definition). 
However, migrants coming from Africa, (who can be seen in Serbia, nowadays, and 
partly in Turkey) do not look like refugees, rather temporary work-seekers or, (as 
some information in the northern countries would have it) in most cases: social 
support seekers… 
The clear tendency is that populations will be diminishing in the European 
region. The American population will not be reducing in the coming period. But in 
Europe, the eastern part of the continent will see the greatest losses compared with 
other parts of the world. Interestingly, the international organizations do not deal with 
the question, why. A few years ago the World Bank published a study with the title: 
“From red to gray”. Now, 30 years after the political changes, nobody is interested in 
that legacy of the socialist times… It cannot be incidental coincidence, that most of 
the countries with the greatest population losses are former CMEA members… 
Nobody is analysing the impact of socialist dictatorship on the East European 
countries. This dictatorship has left its mark not only in the deficit of capital in these 
countries, but also in the low number of babies born. Lost hope in the future results in 
low fertility ratios. And it is reflected in emigration, too… The political changes came 
so quickly, that the transition time was not long enough to recover the skills of the 
people which would have been necessary for free-market - type entrepreneurship. And 
the lack of capital, which was the legacy of socialist planning, forced the transfer of 
national wealth in those countries into foreign hands. All this resulted in a hopeless 
future, instability, weak local cooperation of the countries’ youth. The low living 
standard in these countries and the better wages in the West drained a lot of people 
from these countries.  
Aging is another characteristic phenomenon in the developed world, 
especially in Europe (in China, too, where the one-child program from Deng Xiaoping 
will bring about a radical shrinking of the population and a growing proportion of 
elderly people). In 2018, for the first time in history, persons aged 65 years and over 
outnumbered children under age five worldwide. Projections indicate that by 2050 
there will be more than twice as many people over 65 compared to children under 
five. By 2050, the number of people aged 65 years or over globally will also surpass 
the number of adolescents and youth aged 15 to 24 years. It will have its impact on 
the state-household financial equilibrium of the countries involved. Pension 
financing will be more difficult, the labour force diminishing, payed pension 
contributions and taxes less, volumes of allowances more; demand on health 
services will also increase…  
There are projections in the EU for the coming 50 years. The old-age 
dependency ratio (people aged 65 and above relative to those aged 15 to 64) is 
projected to increase by 21.6 percentage points, from 29.6% in 2016 to 51.2% in 2070. 
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This implies that the EU would go from having 3.3 working-age people for every 
person aged over 65 years to only two working-age persons (EC, 2018).  
2.3. Consequences of aging 
The European Commission summarizes the economic consequences for Europe as follows: 
“The evolution of aging-related costs, however, will vary widely among 
Member States, with costs falling in eight Member States (Greece, Croatia, France, 
Latvia, Estonia, Italy, Lithuania and Spain); increasing by up to 3 percentage points of 
GDP in ten Member States (Portugal, Denmark, Cyprus, Poland, Sweden, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Slovakia); and rising by more than 3 percentage points 
in the remaining ten Member States (Netherlands, Austria, Ireland, Germany, United 
Kingdom, Belgium, CzechRepublic, Slovakia, Malta and Luxembourg). 
Long-term care and healthcare costs are expected to contribute the most to the 
rise in age-related spending, increasing by 2.1 percentage points. Public spending on 
pensions is expected to rise until 2040, before returning close to current levels by 
2070. Education expenditure is projected to remain unchanged by 2070. 
Unemployment benefit expenditure is projected to decline by 0.2 percentage points. 
Pension reforms have made it possible to stabilize public pension spending as 
a share of GDP over the long term, through by increases in the retirement age and 
changes to the parameters of pension systems, including pension indexation. As a 
result, the public pension benefit ratio, which describes the average public pension in 
relation to the average wage, is projected to fall by 10.6 percentage points on average 
in the EU. In Member States with supplementary private pension schemes, the total 
value of pensions relative to average wages is projected to be 10.5 percentage points 
higher than in Member States without. Moreover, retirement ages will be higher in the 
future in general.” (Aging Report 2018) 
All these estimations take for granted the trends in fertility. They do not see 
any factors which could change the trends in society. The only possibility they see is 
to adjust to the trends: simply raising expenditures for health purposes, raising 
retirement ages, and other parametric changes in pension systems. We hardly see 
active arrangements which would try to change the trends. As if everything were fated 
for mankind, as if we were not human beings of intelligence and free will… As if 
there were only private interests, and no public good… However, economic policy 
could be active in influencing social trends. The diminishing of the population is 
slower in countries boasting active pro-family social support. Unfortunately, even that 
is not enough to change the main tendencies. 
Why are demographic changes relevant to the competitiveness of the region? 
Because it is a growing burden on the financing of the ever-increasing share of the 
elderly in the region compared to the active population. Those parts of the world, 
where the demographic structure of society is more balanced between the younger and 
the elder groups, the burden of the pension systems is not such a big challenge for 
both employees and employers. That is, the region is more competitive. 
Let us summarize the situation: The main factor in the former growth of 
Europe was the very intensive participation in the world trade. The EU is now 
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shrinking in the world economy because other countries are growing quicker, both in 
terms of GDP and trade. They are able to do so because their internal market is enlarging 
thanks to the growing population and the massive capital inflow, which is making use 
of the qualified and relatively cheap labour there. For the EU, an aging societiy means 
a burden. In that sense, some emerging markets are more competitive than the EU. 
3. Banking union  
We may say that the shrinking share of the EU in world trade is in a certain sense, a 
sign of diminishing competitiveness of the region compared with other parts of the 
world economy. We have seen that the competitiveness of the region is dependent on 
aging, too. But many experts say that a more integrated financial system in the USA 
contributes to the better functioning of American economy, and this is the direction 
where the EU must seek to raise the competitiveness of the economy of integration. 
We may say, that the ideology in the EU leading organisations has turned back to the 
concept of deepening cooperation. (Not only enlarging integration by the admission 
of the Eastern countries in the European Union.) The EU realized, that it is not enough 
to raise the competitiveness of the core countries by adding more countries to the 
Union. It must, in a certain sense deepen the integration mechanism, too. The financial 
system, the euro, and the banking system must be an effective support of more robust 
growth in the region. 
But the financial crisis not only caused a drop in GDP-growth but it threatened 
the collapse of the whole banking system. It demonstrated how problems can spread 
throughout the financial system and how they directly affect people’s lives. The slow 
recovery in the EU since then has been indicating, that there are great and deep 
problems in the European economies. It is necessary to stimulate a more liberal 
allocation of capital, which must be guaranteed by the free flow of capital.  
The European Banking Federation’s Board called on governments in Europe to 
recognize the key economic role of banks in funding growth and supporting prosperity: 
“Looking ahead to the upcoming policy cycle in the European Union, the 
Board reaffirmed the European banking sector’s constructive commitment to 
sustainably and responsibly financing businesses and households. Specifically, banks 
recognize their role in society when it comes to developing sustainable finance and 
supporting the energy transition together with other industries in order to meet 
international climate change objectives… Banks are fully committed to supporting 
further European integration, specifically in the EU financial services markets through 
the completion of the Banking Union and the creation of an effective Capital Markets 
Union (CMU). This is particularly important at a time of increasing political and 
regulatory global fragmentation, in order to ensure that sufficient financing will 
remain available for the European economy” (EFB 2019). 
Ineffective and excessively burdensome regulations clearly have a negative 
impact on the European economy. 
If the capital market and banking is fragmented in the EU, it surely will 
continue to lag behind the US, the latter having a more integrated banking market 
as a result of liberalization in recent decades. With regard to banking, following 
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the establishment of the Single Market in 1993 in the EU, banking became 
increasingly cross-border in nature. But this was not accompanied by the 
development of a regulatory framework at the supranational level. This became 
obvious during the crisis. 
“The segmentation of banking markets within the euro area is one of the more 
concerning legacies of the financial crisis. Banks were bailed out by national 
governments, under a loose coordination framework defined by the Council, and with 
lighter scrutiny exercised under the State aid framework. Integrated cross-border 
groups were broken down along national lines to allow national tools to be deployed 
to manage crises; and the often difficult negotiations to bring about these results 
dented the trust between Member States” (Enria 2020). 
The national states played the role of crisis managers, and oriented the banks 
towards the internal economy. As a result, a sharp decline happened in cross-border 
banking, even within the euro area. 
Let me quote a longer text from an ECB analysis: “The EU’s banking sector 
is not only the largest in the world, but also accounts for the bulk of the ‘financial de-
globalisation’ observed in cross-border banking since the global financial crisis. In 
this paper we provide an anatomy of the great cross-border banking retrenchment in 
the EU and investigate a wide range of possible drivers of this phenomenon, including 
indicators of banking sector performance and stability, prudential policies and bank 
levies. Using a granular breakdown of cross-border bank lending by instrument and 
counterparty sector, we are able to identify the most affected components of cross-
border lending and shed light on the underlying causes. Banks located in the euro area 
and in the rest of the EU reduced their cross-border bank claims by around 25% since 
the global financial crisis, driven by a sharp and sustained reduction in intra-EU 
claims, which make up 60% of total EU cross-border claims. Within the EU, banks 
have cut their cross-border loans by around 40%, which particularly affected cross-
border interbank lending. Our empirical analysis shows a significant link between 
deteriorating asset quality and the great retrenchment in cross-border banking, 
highlighting the spillovers from national banking sector conditions across the EU. We 
also find evidence that prudential policies can entail spillovers via cross-border 
banking in the EU, albeit with heterogeneity across instruments in terms of direction, 
magnitude and significance. In particular, our results suggest that regulatory arbitrage 
might be possible via the use of foreign branches, while stricter policies at home may 
preclude banks from direct lending activities abroad, even though this does not apply 
within the euro area. For newly introduced bank levies, we do not find a discernible 
link to the great retrenchment, but they may have affected the composition of cross-
border banking by incentivising lending to the non-bank sector. Our analysis suggests 
that tackling the persistent asset quality problems in the EU is pivotal in order to reap 
the potential benefits of cross-border banking which relate for instance to risk 
diversification and risk-sharing. Hence, the findings of this paper make a case for 
completing the banking union. For instance, the rulebook for financial actors in the EU 
needs to be amended by adding a chapter on a harmonised approach to the resolution 
of non-performing loans (NPLs), complemented by countryspecific elements in each 
high-NPL constituency…” (Emter–Schmitz-Tirpák 2018; italics mine) 
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So, the banking groups lack a Europe-wide identity: they are broken into parts 
along national borders. It is really difficult to envisage the centralized management of 
capital and liquidity at the parent level, when there is no clear understanding of how 
to deploy capital and liquidity support to subsidiaries within the banking union, in the 
event of shocks in some countries. The branching structure is still not really being 
used more widely (at least within European banking supervision). The production of 
a single passport of the sort already planned many decades ago in the late 1980s, is 
still not a reality. 
“European corporate and consumer protection laws and our insolvency and 
tax regimes have formed more of a patchwork of legal, regulatory and supervisory 
approaches, with national practices overlapping in some aspects and colliding in 
others. In many areas this still holds true today” – cites Andrea Enria, Chair of the 
Supervisory Board of the ECB (Enria, A. ECB 2020) 
In recent years EU leaders have often spoken about how to “complete the 
banking union.” But, it raises the question of what criteria should be used to assess 
the banking union’s “completeness”?  
Can the playing field for European enterprises be equal, when governments 
are too strongly connected with their county’s banking institutions? When the banks 
are stimulated even by taking risks to support some “important” national enterprises, 
in the hope, that the government will not let them fail? And, when in exchange, they 
support the goverment in financing the deficit stemming from irresponsible 
expenditure motivated by politics? 
It is clear: the stronger members of the EU did not – and still do not – want to 
bail out governments which are in trouble. Even not by bailing out the banks. They 
think the government forced them – or they were anyhow ready – to buy the 
governments’ bonds, that is, monetize the government deficit. 
When will we be able to say that there is completeness in the banking union? 
“A narrow interpretation, based on euro area leaders’ past commitments, equates that 
with breaking the bank-sovereign vicious circle; a more ambitious long-term vision 
for complete banking union implies the removal of all cross-border distortions within 
the euro area banking market. Even the minimalist version, however, entails more 
reforms than those publicly under current consideration”  (Schnabel and Véron, 2018). 
Sovereign risks and bank risks are highly correlated. Irresponsible 
management in big banks may lead to sovereign crises and badly managed state 
budgets can result in bankrupt governments… It may cause a vicious circle, a 
“doomloop”. (In economics, a doomloop is a negative spiral that can result when 
banks hold sovereign bonds and governments bail out banks.) 
The indebtedness of the Greek government was not just a question of the link 
between domestic banks and government. Buying sovereign bonds was a bonanza for 
other buyers as well, not only domestic banks, because the bonds were offering high-
interest rates. Banks in the euro-zone have willingly bought them... Nevertheless, one 
has to question, why did they not think the fact over a bit, as in how could the interest-
rates for those bonds be so much higher, compared, for instance, to the German state 
bonds? Did they not think, that it indicates greater risks? We may assume that investors 
thought that EU would in no way let governments go bankrupt in the euro-zone.  
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The banking sector in the EU must answer the big challenges of our times. 
The responsibility of the sector for the world-wide crisis is unquestionable. In the EU 
even the greatest achievement of the European integration process, the creation of the 
euro, could be in danger. Even more: the EU itself may fall into pieces. 
4. Changes in regulation 
As a reaction to the financial crisis, the EU has planned a lot of changes in the financial 
sector regulation. As a first reaction, it established the European System of Financial 
Supervision (ESFS) in 2010. This was a new supervisory architecture at the European 
level, consisting of three European Supervisory Authorities on the field of capital 
market, banking and insurance, (ESAs: ESMA, EBA, EIOPA), and a board to monitor 
systemic risks – the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). The ESAs and the ESRB 
started their operations in January 2011. 
EBA, the European Banking Authority, had started to harmonize banking 
regulation EU-wide. It published over 250 guidelines, regulatory standards, and 
implemented technical standards. So, since then the single rulebook has become a 
reality. These rules are designed to prevent bank crises from happening in the first 
place, for example by increasing the amount of capital that banks are required to have 
(Capital Requirements Directive/Regulation). It is not just a matter of the amount of 
capital held by the banks. It also is a question of capital quality. That, too, has 
improved dramatically as a result of regulatory reforms in 2010. Euro area banks focus 
now on Common Equity Tier 1 (or CET1), the highest quality of capital (EU, 2016). 
In terms of capital ratios as a measure of the resilience of banks, in 2016 it was a 
couple of percentage points away – since 2008, banks in the euro area have increased 
their Tier 1 capital ratios from 8.4% to 13.7%.  
If banks should get in trouble, there is a common framework to manage the 
process of winding the banks down. (Directiveon Bank Recovery and Resolution). 
The rules would also help protect consumers if banks should get into difficulty. For 
instance, deposits of up to € 100,000 are guaranteed throughout the EU, which should 
help prevent panic withdrawals if a bank is threatened. But, the Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes (DGS) remained national in nature (until 2020). The Commission had 
reviewed the functioning of the DGS Directive by 2019 and was looking for a single, 
pan-European DGS in the context of the banking union. 
Let us start at the beginning. The years after 2010 were burdened with weighty 
discussions of the Greek case. The recent financial crisis demonstrated how 
contagious problems in the financial sector of one country can be, especially in a 
monetary union, and how these problems can directly affect citizens across the euro 
area. It was urgent to go ahead with the deepening of financial-monetary integration… 
The establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in 2013 was 
a great step forward. (With the creation of the SSM, changes were made to the 
European banking authority’s (EBA) voting arrangements to ensure countries 
participating in the SSM would not unduly dominate the EBA’s board of supervisors, 
because some countries are not members of the eurozone). 
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SSM has been created to oversee banks in the euro area and other participating 
European Union (EU) countries. The SSM is the first pillar of Europe’s banking 
union. The second is the Single Resolution Mechanism, which aims to deal quickly 
and efficiently with failing banks. The Single Resolution Board and the Single 
Resolution Fund have been created as an important element of the infrastructure. (The 
safety net is not yet fully established at the European level. As long as deposit 
insurance remains national, Member States will have an incentive to ring-fence their 
banking sectors. This is why there is a need to finalize the banking union by 
establishing a European deposit insurance scheme.) 
The aim, anyhow, was to put in place the banking union. To help lay the 
groundwork for the SSM, an Asset Quality Review was carried out, involving an in-
depth expert examination of some € 3.7 trillion of euro area banks’ assets. A series of 
stress tests were also carried out. The aim of the exercises, which were concluded in 
October 2014, was to assess the resilience of EU banks in the face of adverse economic 
developments, in order to understand remaining vulnerabilities and give the ECB a 
clearer idea of the banks' financial health. The stress tests and the comprehensive 
assessment together helped to dispel doubts and restore confidence in EU banks. 
There is no official or legal definition of what the banking union should be. 
The most common definition is that it means shifting banking-sector policy 
instruments from the national to the European level. The creation of a truly European 
supervision mechanism weakens the link between banks and sovereign nations. This 
indirectly helps to rebuild trust in Europe’s banking sector.  
To strengthen oversight of the banking system, the SSM is a new system to 
supervise banks in the euro area (and other participating EU countries.) The ECB as 
a monetary authority was first of all responsible for money creation, the value of the 
euro, and the monetary policy of the euro-zone. Its tasks are now enlarged. In 
cooperation with the national supervisors, it is responsible for the functioning of the 
SSM. Its Board also includes national supervisory authorities as members. So, the 
legal standing of the Board is unique: different from other EU institutions, though 
member-state institutions are represented in it. According to Annunziata Filippo: „it 
provides a peculiar model of centralization and cooperation amidst European and 
national institutions in the field of banking supervision within the Euro area. Since its 
birth, the SSM has received wide attention from scholars and practitioners, raising an 
overriding amount of discussions and debates. As much as the SSM becomes mature, 
the underlying legal structure becomes clearer, and recent jurisprudence shows that it 
may well be referred to as a highly experimental field of EU Legislation. Indeed, also 
considering traditional topics such as the allocation of powers between Member States 
and EU institutions, or the relationship between EU law and national one, the SSM is 
providing new insights, that might also provide for fruitful developments at a broader 
level of EU Law” (Annunziata 2019). 
The Supervisory Board is part of the ECB, an autonomous entity. At the same 
time, its functions (fulfilling the supervisory tasks), are strictly separated from the 
monetary policy of the ECB. To avoid any conflict of interest between the two, 
restrictions enforce the division; for example, by allowing for the exchange of sensitive 
information only when certain safeguards are observed. (Or so the regulations say…) 
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As a guard of financial stability, ECB by SSM has the role of mitigating the 
prospect of disruptions in the financial intermediation process, to avoid severe impact 
on real economic activity. Financial stability can be defined as a condition in which the 
financial system – which comprises financial intermediaries, markets and market 
infrastructures – is capable of withstanding shocks and unraveling financial imbalances.  
The role of banking supervision on ECB level doesn’t mean only micro-
prudential supervision of the influential big banking institutions, but fulfilling 
macroprudential policies. This activity has different dimensions. Macroprudential 
policies – according to ECB publications - aim to: 
– prevent the excessive build-up of risk, resulting from external factors and 
market failures, to smoothen the financial cycle (time dimension) 
– make the financial sector more resilient and limit contagion effects (cross-
section dimension) 
– encourage a system-wide perspective of financial regulation to create the right 
set of incentives for market participants (structural dimension) (EU regulation 
– ECB 2013) 
The ECB directly supervises significant banks. A bank may be qualified as 
significant depending on its size, its importance to the domestic banking sector or 
whether it has been recapitalized by public funds. The ECB has the authority to do the 
following: (I quote the relevant regulations, EU2013): 
“–conduct supervisory reviews, on-site inspections and investigations; 
– grant or withdraw banking licenses; 
– assess a bank’s acquisition and disposal of qualifying holdings; 
– set higher capital requirements (‘buffers’) to countercurrent or future financial 
crises; 
– impose sanctions for any breach of EU law on credit institutions, financial 
holding companies and mixed financial holding companies. 
– Indirectly supervise banks that are considered to be less significant and are 
directly supervised by their national supervisory authorities.”  
National supervisors remain responsible for issues such as consumer 
protection, money laundering, payment services, and the supervision of branches of 
banks in EU countries that are not part of the SSM.  
Peterson Institute, the independent foreign relations research center also studied 
the EU competitiveness issue. Experts from the Institute summarized their views 
immediately after the start (2013) of the SSM’s aim, the banking union, as follows:  
“Beyond centralizing supervision, the plan as envisioned by euro area leaders 
has three pillars: 
(1) minimizing the near-term need for taxpayer contributions to rescue troubled 
banks; 
(2) preventing moral hazard at the euro area country level by minimizing the 
euro area backstop for troubled banks; and 
(3) preventing moral hazard at the financial institution level by designing rules 
to force shareholders, creditors, and depositors to share in the cost of a 
future rescue” (Ubide 2013). 
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Together these proposals amount to a policy of “national bail-ins” (as most 
investors in the banks are locals) to avoid “euro area bailouts.”  
Some experts found it troublesome that the interest rates are different for the 
periphery than the central economies of the EU because such rates reflect higher 
perceived risk for banks and borrowers. “As long as private lending rates in each 
country are allowed to reflect the location, rather than the ECB’s policy stance, 
monetary policy in euro area countries with troubled banking systems will remain too 
tight, discouraging demand and keeping banks’ balance sheets fragile” - wrote one of 
the the Petersen Institute’s (PIIE) experts (Ubide 2013). 
5. New challenges 
Finance is likely to undergo intensive change over the coming decade for other 
reasons as well. One of the newest challenges for the EU – for the banks and banking 
supervision – is the appearance of innovative technology in all fields of the economy. 
Dealing with banking regulation we must take into consideration that competitive 
banking must be at the same time secure.  
The attitude of bank clients has changed worldwide. Across Europe, 59% of 
internet users now do their banking online, and this number is on the rise. Interesting, 
that for instance in some aspects Sub-Saharan countries are much further ahead in use 
(by adults) of electronic money, than Europe (Relevant data: 25% to 10%). In Europe, 
there is a developed banking infrastructure. It does, as one would put, lower the 
progress in some fields... But European banks have also begun to implement a range 
of innovative technologies. Prime examples are artificial intelligence, or AI, for 
analyzing big data, mobile wallets, and cloud computing. AI and big data help banks 
overcome information asymmetries efficiently: the new tools help banks assess credit 
scores for clients with a limited credit history, at low costs. Without these new tools, 
it would be very difficult to analyze huge amounts of unstructured data.  
This is an opportunity for banking supervisors as well. Enlargement of the 
tasks of the EU- level regulation needs more concentration on the information 
technology. It is more and more important in the banking business, and so for the 
supervisors. Automated reporting, for instance, could ease the burden on banks, and 
allow the authorities to collect data more efficiently. At the same time, machine 
learning could help them to validate – and even analyze – the data.  
A new phenomenon is the appearance of the new fintech institutions. How to 
evaluate all this from the point of view of stability in the banking sector? Fintechs step 
in some of the banks’ playing fields, and are competitors for them. They compete with 
banks in parts of the value chain. They are no banks, but it is important to closely 
follow their activity, when they do step in the field of banks, and engage in core 
banking business. Then they must be treated as banks. As fintech banks might come 
under the scope of banking supervision, it is needed to tackle the relevant risks. There 
are general discussions with the national authorities and the European Banking 
Authority on how to supervise fintech banking. This joint approach is crucial. Some 
countries, like Germany, have already carried into effect a licensing practice 
concerning fintechs. Fintech is a new phenomenon. For this reason the ECB has to 
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have the chance to take a common European stance, right from the start. In April 2020 
the ECB will have a workshop on the topic of fintech supervision. 
6. Conclusion 
We have collected some forecasts on the future role of the European integration in the 
world economy. To preserve the competitiveness of the region- even if its share in 
world GDP and trade will sink in the coming decades-, with special importance on the 
evolution of the banking sector. So we have surveyed the changes in the banking 
regulations over the last quarter of the century, how it helped banking to be more 
effective in the region. The review paid special attention to the period after the 
worldwide financial crisis. Partly, because the crisis had a negative legacy on the 
integration process of the sector, partly, because fully new phenomena have been 
observed in technology in recent years.  
Everything is changing very quickly, so the stability of the banking system is 
a vital question. The study could only be a snapshot of the current situation of the 
banking system and its supervision in Europe. But for countries in the Eastern part of 
the continent, it is worth thinking about the overall European attitude. The free 
movement of labour has been a reality since 2007. Now banking integration is for the 
greater free movement of credit and capital across borders, (though, in a more 
controlled, supervised way). Were it is not necessary to evaluate, what does it mean, 
for all the longed after freedoms in the EU- for instance, the free movement of labour 
–, regarding the East European countries?  
Will the banking union and the free capital movement really serve the 
interests of the whole population of the EU? Or, is it not necessary to put into 
operation certain smoothing mechanisms - more, than what still exists - in different 
aspects of the economy, within the integration? The attenuate results of the banking 
union over the last decade, certainly do not provide strong incentive to join the euro 
for those countries who are still outside the zone. 
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